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THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. BEVERLY MICHAEL, 
Respondent. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Resistance or Oonsent.-To protect his 
right to object to an unreasonable search or seizure a defend-
ant need not forcibly resist an officer's assertion of authority 
to enter his home or search it or his person, but if he freely 
consents to an entry or search, or voluntarily produces evi-
dence against himself, his constitutional rights are not violated 
and any search or taking of evidence pursuant to his consent 
is not unreasonable. 
[2] Id.-Oonsent.-Whether in a particular case an apparent con-
sent was in fact voluntarily given or was in submission to an 
express or implied assertion of authority is a question of fact 
to be determined in the light of the circumstances. 
[3a,3b] Id.-Oonsent.-The evidence in a narcotics case was suf-
ficient to show that the officers' entry into defendant's home 
and subsequent discoveries were made with the consent of 
defendant and her mother where the officers went to such 
home, identified themselves, were admitted by defendant's 
mother, and asked defendant whether she had any narcotics, 
whereupon defendant's mother left the room and returned with 
a bottle containing a narcotic, after which defendant, after 
being asked whether she had any more narcotics, produced 
a box from her bedroom containing other narcotics and hypo-
dermic equipment, such evidence showing that the narcotics 
were voluntarily produced in response to a reasonable inquiry. 
[4] ld.-Voluntary Production of Evidence.-It is not unreason-
able for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses 
or to call on them at their homes for such purposes, and if 
such inquiries result in the criminal's voluntary revealing of 
the evidence against him he may not thereafter assert that 
he acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful 
authority. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting motion to set aside an information. 
David Coleman, Judge. Reversed. 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.lur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
licK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Searches and Seizures, I L 
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Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Lewis Watnick, Deputy 
District Attorneys, for Appellant. 
Forno & Umann and Harry M. Umann for Respondent. 
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-By information defendant was charged 
with four counts of possessing narcotics in violation of Health 
and Safety Code, section 11500, and one prior felony con· 
viction of violating the same section. Her motion to set the 
information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted on 
the ground that all of the evidence against her had been 
obtained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of her 
constitutional rights. The People appeal. 
At the time of her arrest defendant was living at her 
mother's home. Two state narcotics inspectors, an investi-
gator from the Los Angeles district attorney's office, and a 
Los Angeles police officer went to defendant's residence. They 
knocked on the door, identified themselves as officers, and 
were admitted by defendant's mother. They did not have 
a search warrant. One of the officers identified himself to 
defendant and asked her if she had any narcotics in the 
house. Defendant's mother then left the room and returned 
with a bottle containing a narcotic, which the officer took 
from her. She told the officers that "This is all she has." 
Defendant told the officer she knew the bottle contained a 
narcotic, and on being asked whether she had any more 
narcotics, she produced a box from her bedroom containing 
other narcotics and hypodermic equipment, which she handed 
to the officer. Defendant was a.rrested, the evidence was taken 
to police headquarters and analyzed, and four narcotics were 
identified. 
The attorney general contends that the evidence in this case 
was voluntarily produced by defendant and her mother and 
was therefore not illegally obtained. Defendant, on the other 
hand, contends that the admission of the officers into her home 
and the production of the narcotics were in submission to 
authority and without effective consent. Accordingly, she 
contends that anything the officers heard and any physical 
evidence they obtained after the entry without a warrant was 
inadmissible. 
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[1] To protect his right to object to an unreasonable 
search or seizure a defendant need not forcibly resist an 
officer's assertion of authority.to enter his home or search it 
or his person (United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 
[68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210]; Amos v. United States, 255 
U.S. 313, 317 [4 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654]), but if he freely 
consents to an entry or search, or voluntarily produces evi-
dence against himself, his constitutional rights are not violated 
and any search or taking of evidence pursuant to his consent 
is not unreasonable. (Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 
628 [66 S.Ct. 1277, 90 L.Ed. 1477] ; Davis v. United States, 
328 U.S. 582, 593-594 [66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453] ; In re 
Dixon, 41 Ca1.2d 756, 761 [264 P.2d 513].) [2] Whether 
in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact volun-
tarily given or was in submission to an express or implied 
assertion of authority, is a question of fact to be determined 
in the light of all the circumstances. Since the cases that 
have determined this question under varying factual circum-
stances are difficult if not impossible to reconcile (compare 
e.g., Davis v. UnUed States, supra, 328 U.S. 582, 593-594, 
with Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-13 [68 S.Ct. 
367, 92 L.Ed. 436] ; Waxm.an v. United States, 12 F.2d 775, 
with Pritchett v. State, 78 Okla.Crim. 67 [143 P.2d 622, 
623-625] ; Smuk v. People, 72 Colo. 97 [209 P. 636, 637], with 
Salata v. United States, 286 F. 125, 127), and may reflect 
imperfectly the factual situations before the courts that 
decided them, they point to no compelling solution in the 
present case. [3a] On the record before us, we have con-
cluded that the officer's testimony before the magistrate 
constituted sufficient evidence that the entry into the house 
and subsequent discoveries were made with the consent of 
defendant and her mother to justify the admission and use 
of the evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish prob-
able cause for holding defendant to answer. 
This is not a case in which entry was made pursuant to 
the supposed authority of an invalid search warrant. (See 
United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484, 490; Salata v. United 
States, supra, 286 F. 125, 127; Hernandez v. State, 137 Tex. 
Crim. 343 [129 S.W.2d 301, 305 j.) Nor is it a case in which 
the officers entered without the permission or knowledge of 
the occupants (see Dukes v. United States, 275 F. 142, 144-
145; Farris v. United States, 24 F.2d 639, 640), or de-
manded the right to search without a warrant. (See Amos 
v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. 313, 317; United States v. 
j 
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Slusser, 270 F. 818, 819.) All that appears is that 
four officcrs went to defendant's home, ide~tified themselves, 
and were admitted by defendant's mother. Within approxi-
mately a minute of their arrival they asked defendant if 
she had any narcotics, and all of the evidence was then volun-
tat:ily produced by the two women. Under these circum-
stances, to hold as a matter of law that the evidence was 
produced in response to an unlawful assertion of authority 
would seriously hamper officers in the reasonable performance 
of their duties. [4] Thus, it is not unreasonable for officers 
to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon 
them at their homes for such purposes. Such inquiries, 
although courteously made and not accompanied with any 
assertion of a right to enter or search or secure answers, 
would permit the criminal to defeat his prosecution by voiun-
tarily revealing all of the evidence against him and then 
contending that he acted only in response to an implied asser-
tion of unlawful authority. 
[3b] We are not unmindful of the fact that the appearance 
of four officers at the door may be a disturbing experience, 
and that a request to enter made to a distraught or timid 
woman might under certain circumstances carry with it an 
implied assertion of authority that the occupant should not 
be expected to resist. (See State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 
]66 [2 N.E.2d 490, 493]; People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131 [18 
N.E.2d 189, 192] ; Petition of Shoemaker, 9 F.2d 170, 171.) 
Neither defendant nor her mother testified at the preliminary 
hearing, however, and the testimony that was given indicates 
only that the evidence was voluntarily produced in response 
to a reasonable inquiry. (See In re Dixon, supra, 41 Ca1.2d 
756, 761; Gray v. State, 243 Wis. 57, 63 [9 N.W.2d 68]: 
United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 498-499; United 
States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 73-74; State v. Hagan, 47 Idaho 
315 [274 P. 628. 629] ; lIernandez v. State, supra, 137 Tex. 
Crim. 343 [129 S.W.2d 301, 305J: Olark v. Btate, 78 Okla. 
Crim. 423 [149 P.2d 994, 996-997].) 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
